Parallel and distributed data mining offer great promise for addressing cybersecurity. The Minnesota Intrusion Detection System can detect sophisticated cyberattacks on large-scale networks that are hard to detect using signature-based systems. The phenomenal growth in computing power over much of the past five decades has been motivated by scientific applications requiring massive amounts of computation. But lately a major focus for parallel and highperformance computers has been on data-centric applications in which the application's overall complexity is driven by the data's size and nature. Data mining is one of these data-centric applications that increasingly drives development of parallel and distributed computing technology.
number of computer attacks has increased exponentially in the past few years, 3 and their severity and sophistication are also growing. 4 For example, when the Slammer/Sapphire Worm began spreading throughout the Internet in early 2003, it doubled in size every 8.5 seconds and infected at least 75,000 hosts. 3 It caused network outages and unforeseen consequences such as cancelled airline flights, interference with elections, and ATM failures.
The conventional approach to securing computer systems is to design mechanisms such as firewalls, authentication tools, and virtual private networks that create a protective shield. However, these mechanisms almost always have vulnerabilities. They can't ward off attacks that are continually being adapted to exploit system weaknesses, which are often caused by careless design and implementation flaws. This has created the need for intrusion detection, 5, 6 security technology that complements conventional security approaches by monitoring systems and identifying computer attacks. 3 Traditional intrusion detection methods are based on human experts' extensive knowledge of attack signatures (character strings in a message's payload that indicate malicious content). They have several limitations. They can't detect novel attacks, because someone must manually revise the signature database beforehand for each new type of intrusion discovered. And once someone discovers a new attack and develops its signature, deploying that signature is often delayed. These limitations have led to an increasing interest in intrusion detection techniques based on data mining. 5, 6 The Minnesota Intrusion Detection System
The MINDS data-mining-based system (http://www.cs.umn.edu/research/minds) detects unusual network behavior and emerging cyberthreats. It's deployed at the University of Minnesota, where several hundred million network flows are recorded from a network of more than 40,000 computers every day. MINDS is also part of the Interrogator 7 architecture at the US Army Research Lab's Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection (ARL-CIMP), where analysts collect and analyze network traffic from dozens of Department of Defense sites. 8 MINDS is enjoying great operational success at both sites, routinely detecting brand new attacks that signature-based systems could not have found. Additionally, it often discovers rogue communication channels and the exfiltration of data that other widely used tools such as Snort (http://www.snort.org) have had difficulty identifying. 8, 9 Figure 1 illustrates the process of analyzing real network traffic data using MINDS . The MINDS suite contains various modules for collecting and analyzing massive amounts of network traffic. Typical analyses include behavioral anomaly detection, summarization, and profiling. Additionally, the system has modules for feature extraction and for filtering out attacks for which good predictive models exist (for example, for scan detection). Independently, each of these modules provides key insights into the network. When combined, which MINDS does automatically, these modules have a multiplicative affect on analysis. 
Anomaly detection
At MINDS ' core is a behavioral-anomaly detection module based on a novel data-driven technique for calculating the distance between points in a high-dimensional space. Notably, this technique enables meaningful calculation of the similarity between records containing a mixture of categorical and numerical attributes (such as network traffic records). Unlike other extensively investigated anomaly detection methods, this new framework doesn't suffer from numerous false alarms. To the best of our knowledge, no other existing anomaly detection technique can find complex behavior anomalies in a real-world environment while maintaining a very low false-alarm rate. A multithreaded parallel formulation of this module allows analysis of network traffic from many sensors in near-real time at the ARL-CIMP.
Summarization
The ability to summarize large amounts of network traffic can be highly valuable for network security analysts who must often deal with large amounts of data. For example, when analysts use the MINDS anomaly detection algorithm to score several million network flows in a typical window of data, several hundred highly ranked flows might require attention. But due to the limited time available, analysts often can look only at the first few pages of results covering the top few dozen most anomalous flows. Because MINDS can summarize many of these flows into a small representation, the analyst can analyze a much larger set of anomalies than is otherwise possible. Our research group has formulated a methodology for summarizing information in a database of transactions with categorical attributes as an optimization problem. 9, 10 This methodology uses association pattern analysis originally developed to discover consumer behavior patterns in large sales transaction data sets. These algorithms have helped us better understand the nature of cyberattacks as well as create new signature rules for intrusion detection systems. Specifically, the MINDS summarization component compresses the anomaly detection component's output into a compact representation, so analysts can investigate numerous anomalous activities in a single screenshot. 
, and the relative contribution of each basic and derived anomaly detection feature. For example, the second line in figure 2 represents 138 anomalous connections. From this summary, analysts can easily infer that this is a backscatter from a denial-of-service attack on a computer that is outside the network being examined. Such inference is hard to make from individual connections even if the anomaly detection module ranks them highly. Figure 2 shows the analysts' interpretations of several other summaries the system found. 
Profiling
We can use clustering, a data mining technique for grouping similar items, to find related network connections and thus discover dominant modes of behavior. MINDS uses the Shared Nearest Neighbor clustering algorithm, 11 which works particularly well when data is high-dimensional and noisy (for example, network data). SNN is highly computationally intensive of the order O(n 2 ), where n is the number of network connections. So, we need to use parallel computing to scale this algorithm to large data sets. Our group has developed a parallel formulation of the SNN clustering algorithm for behavior modeling, making it feasible to analyze massive amounts of network data. 8 An experiment we ran on a real network illustrates this approach as well as the computational power required to
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run SNN clustering on network data. The data consisted of 850,000 connections collected over one hour. On a 16-CPU cluster, the SNN algorithm took 10 hours to run and required 100 Mbytes of memory at each node to calculate distances between points. The final clustering step required 500 Mbytes of memory at one node. The algorithm produced 3,135 clusters ranging in size from 10 to 500 records. Most large clusters corresponded to normal behavior modes, such as virtual private network traffic. However, several smaller clusters corresponded to minor deviant behavior modes relating to misconfigured computers, insider abuse, and policy violations undetectable by other methods. Such clusters give analysts information they can act on immediately and can help them understand their network traffic behavior. Figure 3 shows two clusters obtained from this experiment. These clusters represent connections from inside machines to a site called GoToMyPC.com, which allows users (or attackers) to control desktops remotely. This is a policy violation in the organization for which this data was being analyzed. 
Detecting distributed attacks
Interestingly, attacks often arise from multiple locations. In fact, individual attackers often control numerous machines, and they can use different machines to launch different steps of an attack. Moreover, the attack's targets could be distributed across multiple sites. An intrusion detection system (IDS) running at one site might not have enough information by itself to detect the attack. Rapidly detecting such distributed cyberattacks requires an interconnected system of IDSs that can ingest network traffic data in near real-time, detect anomalous connections, communicate their results to other IDSs, and incorporate the information from other systems to enhance the anomaly scores of such threats. Such a system consists of several autonomous IDSs that share their knowledge bases with each other to swiftly detect malicious, large-scale cyberattacks. Figure 5 shows a graphical illustration of suspicious connections originating from the outside (box on the right) to machines inside the University of Minnesota's IP space (box on the left) in a typical time window of 10 minutes. Each red dot in the right-hand box represents a suspicious connection made by a machine to an internal machine on port 80. In this case, it means that the internal machine being contacted doesn't have a Web server running, making the external machines that are trying to connect to port 80 suspected attackers. The righthand box indicates that most of these potential attackers are clustered in specific Internet address blocks. A close examination shows that most of the dense areas belong to the network blocks of cable and AOL users located in the US or to blocks allocated to Asia and Latin America. There are 999 unique sources on the outside trying to contact 1,126 destinations inside the University of Minnesota IP network space. The total number of involved flows is 1,516, which means that most external sources made just one suspicious connection to the inside. It's hard to tag a source as malicious on the basis of just one connection. If multiple sites running the same analysis across the IP space report the same external source as suspicious, it would make the classification much more accurate. The ideal scenario for the future would be that we bring the data collected at these different sites to one place and then analyze it. But this isn't feasible because l the data is naturally distributed and more suited for distributed analysis; l the cost of merging huge amounts of data and running analysis at one site is very high; and l privacy, security, and trust issues arise in sharing network data among different organizations.
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So, what's really required is a distributed framework in which these different sites can independently analyze their data and then share high-level patterns and results while honoring the individual sites' data privacy. Implementing such a system would require handling distributed data, addressing privacy issues, and using data mining tools, and would be much easier if a middleware provided these functions. The University of Minnesota, University of Florida, and University of Illinois, Chicago, are developing and implementing such a system (see figure 6 ) as part of a US National Science Foundation-funded collaborative project called Data Mining Middleware for the Grid. 
